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Recent Decisions
LABOR LAW-NATIONAL
CERTED

LABOR RELATIONS ACT-SECTION 7-CON-

ACTIVITY-The United States Supreme Court has held that

an individual employee who asserts a right contained in his collective-bargaining agreement is engaged in "concerted activity"

within the meaning of section 7 of the National Labor Relations
Act.
NLRB v. City Disposal Systems, Inc., 104 S.Ct. 1505 (1984).
On Saturday, May 12, 1979, James Brown, a truck driver for

City Disposal Systems, Inc. (the company), was involved in a near
collision at the company's landfill due to the faulty brakes in the
truck (No. 244) assigned to a coemployee. 1 Brown accompanied his
coemployee to the company's mechanical department, where they
were told that the brakes would be repaired over the weekend or
on Monday morning.2
On Monday morning, when problems developed with Brown's
truck (No. 245), he returned to the mechanical department. Brown
reported the problem to his supervisor who first told him to
"punch out" and go home, but then asked him to drive truck No.
244. Brown refused to drive this truck, citing its brake problems.
An argument followed and another supervisor became involved.
Brown referred at one point to the "safety of the men,"' but did
1. NLRB v. City Disposal Systems, Inc., 104 S. Ct. 1505, 1508 (1984). City Disposal
Systems, Inc., is a contract garbage hauler for the City of Detroit. Its drivers haul garbage to
a landfill approximately thirty-seven miles from the city. Each driver is assigned a truck
which he or she drives each day, provided there are no mechanical problems with that particular vehicle. Id.
2. Id. at 1508. The Administrative Law Judge indicated that Brown and his coworker
were told that truck No. 244 would be fixed "over the weekend." City Disposal Systems,
Inc., 256 N.L.R.B. 451, 452 (1982). In the restatement of the facts by the Court of Appeals,
however, the Monday morning alternative was inexplicably added. City Disposal Systems
Inc. v. NLRB, 683 F.2d 1005, 1006 (6th Cir. 1982), rev'd, 104 S. Ct. 1505 (1984). While this
point is not an issue in the present case, its significance lies in the fact that the Supreme
Court based its decision in part on the finding that Brown was expressing a "reasonable
belief" that truck No. 244 was in disrepair. 104 S. Ct. at 1516.
3. 104 S. Ct. at 1509. It is of interest, if not of relevance, that the ALJ discounted all
of Brown's uncorroborated testimony due to his prior conviction (approximately ten years
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not refer specifically to his rights under the collective-bargaining
agreement or even to the existence of the agreement which covered
him. 4 The argument finally ended with the supervisors returning to
their offices and Brown going home. Later in the day, Brown was
notified that he had been discharged. His subsequent attempts to
regain his employment were not successful.
The next day, Brown filed a written grievance with the union in
accordance with the collective-bargaining agreement. The union,
however, refused to process the grievance since it found no objective merit to Brown's complaint.' There was no evidence that
Brown sought to involve other employees in his claim, or to warn
them of the potential danger of operating truck No. 244. 8
Brown filed an unfair labor practice charge with the National
Labor Relations Board (the Board) on September 7, 1979. The Administrative Law Judge (ALJ)held that Brown was discharged for
refusing to drive truck No. 244, that his conduct was "concerted
activity" within the meaning of section 7 of the National Labor
Relations Act (the Act)" and that the company's discharge of
before) for the crime of uttering and publishing. 256 N.L.R.B. at 452.
4. 104 S. Ct. at 1509. The relevant provisions of Article XXI of the collective-bargaining agreement between City Disposal Systems, Inc. and Local 247 of the International
Brotherhood of Teamsters are as follows:
The Employer shall not require employees to take out on the streets and highways
any vehicle that is not in safe operating condition or equipped with safety appliances
prescribed by law. It shall not be a violation of the Agreement where employees refuse to operate such equipment unless such refusal is unjustified.
The Employer shall not ask or require any employee to take out equipment that
has been reported by any other employee as being in an unsafe operating condition
until same has been approved as being safe by the mechanical department.
Id. at 1508 n.1.
5. Id. at 1509. The company's alleged reasons for the dismissal were that Brown had
voluntarily quit and that he had disobeyed orders in refusing to drive truck No. 244. 256
N.L.R.B. at 453.
6. 104 S. Ct. at 1509. Brown charged that truck No. 244 was defective and that therefore the order to drive that truck and the subsequent dismissal for failure to follow the
order were improper according to the terms of the collective-bargaining agreement. Id.
7. Id. The union applied an objective standard to the issue of whether Brown's refusal
to drive truck No. 244 was "unjustified" based on its interpretation of the collective bargaining agreement. Id.
8. 104 S. Ct. at 1519 (O'Connor, J., dissenting). The company maintained a bulletin
board for the employees to warn each other about equipment problems. 683 F.2d at 1007.
9. 104 S. Ct. at 1509. Section 7 of the National Labor Relations Act (the Act) provides
in pertinent part:
Employees shall have the right to self-organization, to form, join or assist labor organizations, to bargain collectively through representatives of their own choosing, and
to engage in other concerted activities for the purpose of collective bargaining or
other mutual aid or protection.
29 U.S.C. § 157 (1982).
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Brown was, therefore, an unfair labor practice under section
8(a)(1) of the Act."0 The Board adopted the findings of fact and
conclusions of law of the ALJ and ordered that Brown be reinstated with back pay." On petition for enforcement of the Board's
order, the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals refused enforcement on
the grounds that Brown's conduct was not "concerted activity"
and thus was not protected by section 7 of the Act.' 2
The Supreme Court granted certiorari to resolve the conflict
which had arisen among several courts of appeals over the scope of
the concept of "concerted activity."'" The Court was thus confronted with the issue of whether an individual employee's honest
and reasonable assertion of his rights under a collective bargaining
agreement constitutes "concerted activity" within the meaning of
section 7 of the Act. Justice Brennan's majority opinion answered
this question in the affirmative, thereby reversing the holding of
the Sixth Circuit. The case was remanded, however, to consider
whether Brown's conduct was also "protected" by the Act.'
Before the Court for the first time, then, was the specific issue of
whether the Interboro doctrine, which deems an individual's reasonable and honest invocation of his rights under a collective-bargaining agreement to be "concerted activity" within the meaning
of section 7 of the Act,' 5 was a reasonable interpretation of the
10. 104 S. Ct. at 1509. Section 8(a)(1) of the Act provides:
It shall be an unfair labor practice for an employer(1) to interfere with, restrain, or coerce employees in the exercise of the rights
guaranteed in [section 7].
29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(1) (1982).
11. 256 N.L.R.B. at 451.
12. 683 F.2d at 1008. The court found no substantial evidence of "concerted activity"
relying on the test established in the Sixth Circuit-whether the individual's claim was
made "on behalf of other employees or at least ... with the object of inducing or preparing
for group action and [had] some arguable basis in the collective bargaining agreement." Id.
at 1007 (quoting ARO, Inc. v. NLRB, 596 F.2d 713, 718 (6th Cir. 1979)).
13. 104 S. Ct. at 1508. Those decisions accepting the principle that the concept of
"concerted activity" includes the claims of individuals invoking rights under their collectivebargaining agreements on their own behalf include: NLRB v. Ben Pekin Corp., 452 F.2d 205
(7th Cir. 1971); NLRB v. Selwyn Shoe Mfg. Corp., 428 F.2d 217 (8th Cir. 1970); NLRB v.
Interboro Contractors, Inc., 388 F.2d 495 (2d Cir. 1967). Those decisions rejecting the principle include: Royal Development Co. v. NLRB, 703 F.2d 363 (9th Cir. 1983); Roadway Express, Inc. v. NLRB, 700 F.2d 687 (11th Cir. 1983); NLRB v. Northern Metal Corp., 440
F.2d. 881 (3d Cir. 1971). See also Kohls v. NLRB, 629 F.2d 173 (D.C. Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 931 (1981) (expressing doubt about the validity of the Interboro doctrine);
NLRB v. Buddies Super Markets, Inc., 481 F.2d 714 (5th Cir. 1973) (dictum).
14. 104 S. Ct. at 1516.
15. The court in NLRB v. Interboro Contractors, Inc., 388 F.2d 495 (2d Cir. 1967),
stated that "while interest on the part of fellow employees would indicate a concerted pur-
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Act."' Justice Brennan cited two rationales employed by the courts
to form the basis of what has become known as the Interboro doctrine. First, the assertion of a right provided for in a collectivebargaining agreement is an extension of the concerted activity
which gave rise to the agreement.1 7 Second, every employee covered by a collective-bargaining agreement is indirectly benefited by
one employee's invocation of a right contained in the agreement. 8
Justice Brennan suggested that the conflict among the courts
over the Interboro doctrine related simply to a disagreement regarding the nature of the relationship that must exist between the
action of the individual and the actions of the group.' 9 No court, in
fact, followed a strict interpretation of section 7 "concerted activity," which would limit application of the section's protections
solely to situations where more than one employee act together.
Rather, according to Justice Brennan, the focus had been on
whether the individual was acting on his own behalf or on behalf of
his coworkers. 0
Reviewing the legislative history of the Act, Justice Brennan
found the Interboro doctrine entirely consistent with the Act's
purpose, which he identified as reflecting a desire to equalize bargaining power between a company's management and its employees, to encourage collective bargaining and to promote labor stability.2" The Interboro doctrine, for example, recognizes that the
bargaining inequality between employer and employee may conpose, activities involving attempts to enforce the provisions of a collective-bargaining agreement may be deemed to be for concerted purposes even in the absence of interest by fellow
employees." Id. at 500.
16. 104 S. Ct. at 1510. The Court reaffirmed the principle that the Board is to be given
broad discretion to interpret the Act in light of its considerable experience with the realities
of modern labor/management dynamics in Eastex, Inc. v. NLRB, 437 U.S. 556 (1978). Considerable deference is, therefore, given to the Board's reasonable constructions of the Act.
See NLRB v. Ironworkers, 434 U.S. 335 (1978).
17. 104 S. Ct. at 1510. E.g., Bunney Bros. Constr. Co., 139 N.L.R.B. 1516, 1519 (1962).
Justice Brennan further asserted that individual and group activity, within the context of a
collective-bargaining agreement, are analytically inseparable. For example, if an individual
joins a labor organization, he does so as an individual, yet this is protected activity under
section 7 of the Act. It would be senseless to protect the individual while he is negotiating
the collective-bargaining agreement but deny him protection when he seeks to enforce the
agreement. 104 S. Ct. at 1512.
18. 104 S. Ct. at 1510. E.g., Interboro Contractors, Inc., 157 N.L.R.B. 1295, 1298
(1966), enforced, 388 F.2d 495 (2d Cir. 1967).
19. 104 S. Ct. at 1511.
20. Id. See, e.g., ARO, Inc. v. NLRB, 596 F.2d at 713; NLRB v. Northern Metal Co.,
440 F.2d at 884..
21. 104 S. Ct. at 1512-13.
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tinue even after the collective-bargaining agreement is in place,
and thus attempts to mitigate the inequality by affording further
protections to the individual employee. Furthermore, the reasonable statements or complaints of the individual employee may act
as an effective alternative to the formal grievance process and become an independent means of enforcing and strengthening the
collective-bargaining agreement.22
The Court then considered the two primary arguments against
the Interboro doctrine: that the employer is unfairly disadvantaged
and that the grievance/arbitration process is undermined. Rejecting first the argument that the employer is disadvantaged, Justice Brennan pointed out that the individual employee's conduct
must be "protected" within the meaning of the Act. Furthermore,
as with any contract, the employer is free to negotiate a provision
in the collective-bargaining agreement which prevents this type of
informal grievance procedure. "3 Justice Brennan then maintained
that the Interboro doctrine does not undermine the arbitration
process for three reasons: first, employees who take unfair advantage of their ability to circumvent the established grievance procedures risk the finding that their conduct is not protected by the
Act; second, since the courts already recognize claims outside the
grievance process when more than one employee is involved, the
increase in claims arising from individual activity is unlikely to be
significant; and third, the Board retains the power to defer resolution of the dispute to the grievance arbitration process.2 4
Addressing the facts of the case at bar, Justice Brennan contended that there was sufficient evidence that Brown's conduct was
"concerted activity" within the meaning of section 7 of the Act, as
interpreted by the Interboro doctrine. Brown's failure to refer explicitly to the collective-bargaining agreement did not invalidate
his attempt to invoke his rights under that agreement. Again deferring to the discretion of the Board, the Court concurred that a
requirement of explicit reference would be an unnecessary burden
on the average working man.2 5 Furthermore, Brown's honest and
reasonable belief that the truck was unsafe, rather than the objective standard applied by the union, was sufficient to bring his complaint within the definition of "concerted activity. '26 In conclusion,
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

at
at
at
at
at

1513-14.
1514.
1514-15.
1515.
1516.
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however, Justice Brennan stated that while Brown's conduct was
clearly concerted activity, it was protected activity only if the right
invoked by Brown was in fact protected by the collective-bargaining agreement. Since the issue of whether the activity was protected was not before the Court, it remanded the case for further
consideration of this issue.
Justice O'Connor's dissenting opinion, which was joined by Chief
Justice Burger and Justices Powell and Rehnquist, maintained
that the Interboro doctrine is an "exercise in undelegated legislative power by the Board.

' 28

Agreeing with the majority's basic

statement that the disagreement among the courts which have considered this issue is actually limited to a disagreement regarding
the appropriate nexus between the individual and the group action, 9 Justice O'Connor nevertheless suggested that the "concepts
of individual action for personal gain and 'concerted activity' are
intuitively incompatible." 30 A major purpose of the Act, Justice
O'Connor asserted, is to encourage employees to act together, since
group action tends to reduce the inequality and tensions between
employers and employees and provides for more efficient administration of labor/management relations. Given this basic purpose of
the Act, then, Justice O'Connor concluded that the Interboro doctrine is not a reasonable interpretation of the Act. 1
Justice O'Connor's primary criticism of the majority opinion was
her contention that the majority had confused the employee's substantive contract rights with the process by which those rights are
enforced. The real issue in the instant case, according to Justice
O'Connor, was whether the employee's contract rights were to be
enforced by the Board or by the employee's collective bargaining
representative, with recourse to the courts in extreme cases. From
her review of the legislative history of the Act, Justice O'Connor
concluded that Congress had intended to limit the Board's power
to enforce collective-bargaining agreements in order to avoid excessive governmental interference with these private agreements. The
Board has considerable discretion with respect to unfair labor
practices, but possesses limited discretion with respect to contract
disputes when the collective-bargaining agreement is in place. 2
27.
28.
29.
30.
31.
32.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

at
at
at
at
at

1517 (O'Connor, J.,
1519 (O'Connor, J.,
1517 (O'Connor, J.,
1518-19 (O'Connor,
1517 (O'Connor, J.,

dissenting).
dissenting).
dissenting).
J., dissenting).
dissenting).
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Addressing the facts, Justice O'Connor contended that the Interboro doctrine made "little sense" when applied to Brown's dilemma. She pointed out that Brown had not sought the aid of his
coworkers, that he had not sought the aid of his union representative and that he had not attempted to warn his fellow employees of
the danger of driving truck No. 244. The evidence, Justice
O'Connor concluded, suggested that Brown was acting strictly for
his own personal benefit."3
The issue raised in City Disposal Systems concerns the proper
interpretation of the term "concerted activities." While the organization of labor was an increasingly accepted trend in the early
1900's 4', the phrase "concerted activities for the purpose of collective bargaining or other mutual aid or protection" first became
part of the federal labor law by its inclusion in the Norris-LaGuardia Act of 1932,11 an act designed to protect the growing labor organizations by sharply limiting the availability of the injunction in
federal courts in cases involving labor disputes." The National Industrial Recovery Act, which followed Norris-LaGuardia in 1933,
33. Id. at 1519 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
34. See, e.g., The Clayton Act, § 20, 29 U.S.C. § 52 (1982) (original version at ch. 323,
§ 20, 38 Stat. 738 (1914)) ("no restraining order or injunction shall prohibit any person or
persons, whether singly or in concert . . . from ceasing to perform any work or labor, or
from recommending, advising, or persuading others by peaceful means so to do"); II NLRB,
LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONs AcT OF 1935 2431 (quoting the
statement attached to the proclamation of President Wilson establishing the National War
Labor Board in 1918: "The right of workers to organize in trade unions and to bargain
collectively through chosen representatives is recognized and affirmed."); Texas & New Orleans Ry. Co. v. Brotherhood of Railway Clerks, 281 U.S. 548, 570 (1930) ("It has long been
recognized that employees are entitled to organize for the purpose of securing the redress of
grievances and to promote agreements with employers relating to rates of pay and conditions of work.").
35. Pub. L. No. 72-65, 47 Stat. 70 (codified at 29 U.S.C. §§ 101-115 (1982)). Section 2
of the Norris-LaGuardia Act declares the public policy to be as follows:
The individual unorganized worker is commonly helpless to exercise actual liberty
of contract and to protect his freedom of labor, and thereby to obtain acceptable
terms and conditions of employment, wherefore . . . he shall be free from the interference, restraint, or coercion of employers of labor, or their agents, in the designation
of such representatives or in self-organization or in other concerted activities for the
purpose of collective bargaining or other mutual aid or protection.
29 U.S.C. § 102 (1982).
36. Section 4 of the Norris-LaGuardia Act provides that:
No court of the United States shall have jurisdiction to issue any restraining order or
temporary or permanent injunction in any case involving or growing out of any labor
dispute to prohibit any person or persons participating or interested in such dispute
' * . from doing, whether singly or in concert, any of the following acts . ...
29 U.S.C. § 104 (1982).
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adopted the phrase in its section 7(a),37 the antecedent of section 7
of the National Labor Relations Act of 1935. 3s The phrase has survived both the Taft-Hartley amendments of 194739 and the Landrum-Griffin amendments of 1959.40 Yet, despite its historical inclusion in the federal labor statutes, the term "concerted
activities" remains without an authoritative Congressional definition or interpretation."1
A review of the early judicial treatment of the concerted activity
issue suggests that courts have readily accepted the meaning of the
"concerted activity" phrase as requiring some form of group action, but nevertheless have struggled with its application to the
great variety of situations which arise in the market place. In
NLRB v. Peter CaillerKohler Swiss Chocolates Co.,4 2 for example,
Judge Learned Hand described one aspect of concerted activity:
When all the workmen in a shop make common cause with a fellow workman over his separate grievance and go on strike in his support, they engage
in a "concerted activity" for "mutual aid or protection," although the aggrieved workman is the only one of them who has any immediate stake in
the outcome. The rest know that by their action each one of them assures
himself, in case his turn ever comes, of the support of the one whom they all
are helping; and the solidarity so established is "mutual aid" in the most

37. Pub. L. No. 73-67, § 7(a), 48 Stat. 195 (1933) (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 707 (1982)).
The statute was held unconstitutional in Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S.
495 (1935), and was amended and modified by Act of June 14, 1935, ch. 246, 49 Stat. 375.
Section 7(a) of the National Industrial Recovery Act provided as follows:
That employees shall have the right to organize and bargain collectively through representatives of their own choosing, and shall be free from the interference, restraint,
or coercion of employers of labor, or their agents, in the designation of such representatives or in self-organization or in other concerted activities for the purpose of
collective bargaining or other mutual aid or protection ....
Id.
38. Pub. L. No. 74-198, 49 Stat. 449 (1935) (codified at 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-68 (1982)).
This legislation is popularly known as the "Wagner Act."
39. Labor-Management Relations Act of 1947, Pub. L. No. 80-101, 61 Stat. 136 (codified at 29 U.S.C. §§ 141-67, 171-97 (1982)). See HR. REP. No. 510, 80th Cong., 1st Sess.,
reprinted in 1947 U.S. CODE CONG. SERV. 1135, 1144 ("Both the House bill and Senate
amendment in amending the National Labor Relations Act preserved the right under section 7 of that act of employees ... to engage in other concerted activities for the purpose of
collective bargaining or other mutual aid or protection.").
40. Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act of 1959, Pub. L. No. 86-257, 73
Stat. 519 (codified at 29 U.S.C. §§ 401-531 (1982)).
S41. 104 S. Ct. at 1512. See also Meyers Indus., Inc., 268 N.L.R.B. No. 73, 115
L.R.R.M. (BNA) 1025, 1025 (1984); Gorman & Finkin, The Individual and the Requirement
of "Concert" Under the National Labor Relations Act, 130 U. PA. L. REV. 286, 331-46
(1981); Brief for Petitioner at 17-18, NLRB v. City Disposal Systems, 104 S. Ct. 1505 (1984).
42. 130 F.2d 503 (2d Cir. 1942).
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This description, while illustrating the ambiguities which can attach to the concept of concerted activity, pointed to several important elements in its analysis. First, there was clearly group action.
Second, there was a lawful and protected labor objective. Third,
while an individual's self-interested activity was found in the action, there was an identifiable "purpose of. . .mutual aid or protection" from which the court found "solidarity" among the
4
coworkers.
Several years later the concept of concerted activity was considered again in Joanna Cotton Mills Co. v. NLRB, 45 where a supervisor warned employee Blakely that, among other things, he was
spending too much time with one of the women weavers while she
was at her work. Blakely reacted furiously and shouted abusively
at the supervisor. A short time later, Blakely circulated a petition
calling for the supervisor's discharge. When he presented the petition, signed by several of his coworkers, however, Blakely was discharged.46 Noting that the employer could legitimately have fired
Blakely for his insubordination in his initial argument with the supervisor,47 the court refused to attach an overly literal interpretation to the "concerted activities" phrase which would accord
Blakely protection simply because group action was evidenced by
the signatures of his coworkers. The court concluded that Blakely's
conduct was nothing more than his effort "to vent his spleen upon
a supervisory employee. '4 8 This case, then, is distinguishable from
Peter Cailler Kohler Swiss Chocolates Co. because the "purpose"
43. Id. at 505-06. Judge Hand also stated that "the act does not excuse 'concerted
activities,' themselves independently unlawful." Id. at 506.
44. The following cases present other fact situations in which the courts have found
concerted activity: Salt River Valley Water User's Ass'n v. NLRB, 206 F.2d 325, 328 (9th
Cir. 1953) (employee discharged for circulating petition concerning working hours and conditions); NLRB v. Phoenix Mut. Life Ins. Co., 167 F.2d 983, 988 (7th Cir. 1948) (two salesmen discharged for drafting a letter suggesting personnel changes in the cashier's department); Root-Carlin, Inc., 92 N.L.R.B. 1313, 1314 (1951) (employee discharged for discussing
the need for union organization with his coemployees); Texas Textile Mills, 58 N.L.R.B. 352,
371 (1944) (employee discharged for acting as spokesman for his fellow employees regarding
the general dissatisfaction with a change in working hours).
45. 176 F.2d 749 (4th Cir. 1949).
46. Id. at 751.
47. Id. at 752. The court asserted that the Act was not intended to interfere with the
employer's right to discharge insubordinate employees when there was no evidence of employer intimidation or coercion with respect to the employee's section 7 rights. Id. at 753.
48. Id. The court further concluded that "it is not the motive of the participants that
we are concerned with here but the 'purpose' of the activity." Id.
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of the conduct was to express a mere personal gripe rather than a
lawful labor objective. 9 Blakely's "gripe" did not rise to the level
of a "grievance," within the protection of section 7 of the Act."
On the other hand, a number of early decisions found certain
employee conduct outside the protection of the Act because of its
violent or unlawful nature. In Auto Workers, Local 232 v. Wiscon1 the Court held that the Act
sin Employment Relations Board,"
did not preclude the state's power to enjoin sporadic work stoppages, which were not protected by the Act.52 While the use of the
injunction in federal court to curb "concerted activities" had been
strictly limited by the Norris-LaGuardia Act, 53 the Court nevertheless stated that illegal activity is not made legal within the meaning of the Act because it is done in concert." ' Thus, activity which
was technically in concert lost the protection of the Act because of
55
its unlawful quality.
It was into this judicial interpretive framework of section 7 "concerted activities" that the Board interjected the Interboro doctrine
in the 1960's. The apparent origin of this new doctrine was a 1962
Board decision5 6 which found "concerted activity" within the
meaning of section 7 of the Act when one employee truck driver
was discharged for claiming "show-up" time, a right arguably in49. Id.
50. See also Mushroom Transp. Co. v. NLRB, 330 F.2d 683, 684-85 (3d Cir. 1964)
(employee's persistent complaints voiced among his coemployees were determined to be
"mere talk" which was not "looking toward group action"); NLRB v. Ryder Tank Lines,
Inc., 310 F.2d 233, 235 (4th Cir. 1962) (two employees' constant "bickering, backbiting" in
an attempt to interfere with the management of the terminal was the sole reason for their
discharge); NLRB v. Office Towel Supply Co., 201 F.2d 838, 841 (2d Cir. 1953) (employee's
statement to coemployees that "[t]his is a hell of a place to work ... a girl doesn't get time
to go to the ladies' room" was termed "mere griping"); Continental Mfg. Corp., 155
N.L.R.B. 255, 257-58 (1965) (employee's letter handed directly to one of the company's owners citing personal complaints regarding the management was not protected concerted
activity).
51. 336 U.S. 245 (1948). This decision was overruled on other grounds in International
Ass'n of Machinists v. Wisconsin Employment Relations Comm'n, 427 U.S. 132, 151 (1976).
52. Auto Workers, 336 U.S. at 264-65.
53. See supra note 36.
54. 336 U.S. at 258.
55. Id. See also Mastro Plastic Corp. v. NLRB, 350 U.S. 270, 280 (1956) (economic
strike in violation of no-strike clause in collective-bargaining agreement would be "unprotected" activity even if it were "concerted"); Southern Steamship Co. v. NLRB, 316 U.S. 31,
38-39 (1942) (strike by seamen on board their vessel docked in a foreign port in violation of
the anti-mutiny statutes of the criminal code); NLRB v. Sands Mfg. Co., 306 U.S. 332, 344
(1939) (employees repudiated the contract with their employer); NLRB v. Fansteel Metallurgical Corp., 306 U.S. 240, 256 (1939) (employees forcefully and violently seized their employer's buildings to stage a sit-down strike).
56. Bunney Bros. Constr. Co., 139 N.L.R.B. 1516 (1962).
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cluded in the collective-bargaining agreement which covered his
work. The Board reasoned, without citing any authority, that a single employee's assertion of a right contained in his collective-bargaining agreement was an extension of the concerted activity which
gave rise to the agreement.5 7 While the Board continued to apply
this new rule, 58 it did not receive its first judicial endorsement until 1967 when the Second Circuit enforced the Board's decision in
NLRB v. Interboro Contractors, Inc. 59 In an alternative holding,
the court adopted the Board's reasoning that the individual employee's attempts to enforce a provision of the collective-bargaining agreement were concerted activity because the enforcement of
the provision would inure to the benefit of all the employees.6
Thus, the Interboro doctrine, which enables the Board to find concerted activity in the solitary action of an individual, was born of
these two Board rationales. 1
While at least two circuits readily accepted the Interboro doctrine,62 the judicial reaction to the doctrine was generally unfavorable.6 3 The opinions adopting the doctrine did not include significant analysis of the issue and seem to have been based primarily
on the principle of deference to the Board's reasonable constructions of the Act.6 4 On the other hand, those courts which had rejected the Interboro doctrine considered it an unwarranted expan57. Id. at 1519.
58. See, e.g., New York Trap Rock Corp., Nytralete Aggregate Div., 148 N.L.R.B. 374
(1964).
59. 388 F.2d 495 (2d Cir. 1967).
60. Id. at 500. See Interboro Contractors Inc., 157 N.L.R.B. 1295, 1298 (1966).
61. In NLRB v. John Langenbacher Co., 398 F.2d 459 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 393
U.S. 1049 (1969), the Second Circuit expressly added to the Interboro doctrine the requirement that the employee have a reasonable basis for believing that the right he asserts is, in
fact, in his collective-bargaining agreement. Id. at 463. In Ontario Knife Co. v. NLRB, 637
F.2d 840 (2d Cir. 1980), however, the Second Circuit refused to extend the doctrine to apply
to employees not covered by a collective-bargaining agreement. See also Brief for Petitioner,
supra note 41, at 13, 14.
62. See, e.g., NLRB v. Ben Pekin Corp., 452 F.2d 205 (7th Cir. 1971); NLRB v. Selwyn
Shoe Mfg. Corp., 428 F.2d 217 (8th Cir. 1970).
63. See supra note 13.
64. See, e.g., NLRB v. Ben Pekin Corp., 452 F.2d at 206 (quoting Interboro, "We
agree with the Second Circuit"); NLRB v. Selwyn Shoe Mfg. Corp., 428 F.2d at 221 ("We
think it obvious that rights secured by such an agreement, though personal to each employee, are protected rights under § 7 of the Act because the collective bargaining agreement
is the result of concerted activities by the employees ....
"). Two notable exceptions, however, are the oft-cited dissenting opinion of Judge Lay in Illinois Ruan Transp. Corp. v.
NLRB, 404 F.2d 274, 284-90 (8th Cir. 1968) (Lay, J., dissenting), and that of Judge Biggs in
NLRB v. Northern Metal Co., 440 F.2d 881, 887-88 (3d Cir. 1971) (Biggs, J., dissenting).
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sion by the Board of the plain meaning of the statute.0 5 The test
for "concerted activity" established by the court in ARO, Inc. v.
NLRB is illustrative of the various tests adopted by other courts
which rejected the doctrine:
For an individual claim or complaint to amount to concerted action under
the Act it must not have been made solely on behalf of an individual employee, but it must be made on behalf of other employees or at least be
made with the object of inducing or preparing for group action and have
some arguable basis in the collective bargaining agreement."

The common threads which held these tests together were the attempts to remove the self-interested complainer from the protection of the Act and to encourage group action. There was also an
7
unwillingness to interfere with management's business discretion.1
As discussed above, the courts which have addressed the issue of
"concerted activity" have disagreed as to the scope of section 7's
protections, yet have agreed that the Act does not cover or reach
all types of employee conduct. Although clear lines cannot be
drawn to define the area of protected activity, it may be helpful to
identify three major conduct-types to elucidate the Board's Interboro doctrine, as adopted by the Court in City Disposal Systems, and determine the doctrine's practical effect in the field of
labor law. The sliding scale of competing management and labor
interests, operating within the context of the public interest in an
efficient and productive economy, is inherent in the analysis.
At the opposite ends of the scale are the personal "gripe" and
the unlawful "grab." Both are unprotected by the Act whether the
conduct involves the participation of many employees or the solitary action of an individual. The Act, however, identifies for protection certain types of employee complaints and conduct, which
therefore are placed in the category of the protected grievance.
The "gripe," which typically affects only the griping employee, is
deemed by labor law and public policy to be too insignificant to
warrant the invocation of the Board's quasi-judicial machinery.
Such claims are considered too remote to establish a legal nexus
with the Act or the agreement, even though they may be workrelated. 8 The employee, for example, who feels that the employer
65. See, e.g., Royal Dev. Co. v. NLRB, 703 F.2d 363, 374 (9th Cir. 1983); ARO, Inc. v.
NLRB, 596 F.2d 713, 717 (6th Cir. 1979); NLRB v. Northern Metal Co., 440 F.2d 881, 884

(3d Cir.
66.
67.
68.

1971).
ARO, Inc. v. NLRB, 596 F.2d at 718.
Id. But see Brief for Petitioner, supra note 41, at 14-15.
104 S. Ct. at 1512 n.10 ("Of course, at some point an individual employee's actions
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is inhibiting his romantic pursuits during working-time cannot call
on the Act to adjust his claim."' The law applies an implicit cost/
benefit analysis to determine that the public is unwilling to bear
the expense of providing the employee with a forum for the expression of his idiosyncratic complaints. The Act, therefore, recognizes
the employer's discretion to determine when an employee's griping
has become too disruptive or too frequent to justify his continued
employment.70
The "grab," on the other hand, is best identified by its unlawful
character. The employee attempts to grab something which the law
is not prepared to give him. Thus, when he attempts to grab a
right which his collective-bargaining agreement does not provide
him, through a violation of the agreement, 71 or when he attempts
to grab an abusive or violent solution to his problem, 72 he loses the
protection of the Act. The interest of the employee provoked to
such drastic action may be relatively high but it is nevertheless
outweighed by the employer's interest in a secure collective-bargaining agreement as well as undamaged person and property.7 3
In the middle ground between unprotected "gripes" and "grabs,"
may become so remotely related to the activities of fellow employees that it cannot reasonably be said that the employee is engaged in concerted activity.").
69. Joanna Cotton Mills Co. v. NLRB, 176 F.2d 749, 751 (4th Cir. 1949).
70. See, e.g., Indiana Gear Works v. NLRB, 371 F.2d 273, 276-77 (7th Cir. 1967) (employee discharged for ridiculing his boss with cartoons and sarcastic comments); ABF
Freight Systems, Inc., 271 N.L.R.B. No. 6, 116 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 1330, 1332 (1984) (employee
driver discharged for "obstructively raising petty and/or unfounded complaints" regarding
the condition of company's trucks); Capitol Ornamental Concrete Specialties, Inc., 248
N.L.R.B. 851, 851 (1980) (employee discharged for his abusive complaints regarding the condition of the driveway to the employee parking lot).
7-1. 104 S. Ct. at 1514. See, e.g., Fournelle v. NLRB, 670 F.2d 331, 333 (D.C. Cir. 1982)
(employee suspended for supporting and encouraging a strike in violation of the provision of
the collective-bargaining agreement prohibiting encouraging or supporting strikes); Irvin H.
Whitehouse & Sons v. NLRB, 659 F.2d 830, 836 (7th Cir. 1981) (employees violated the nostrike obligation implied from the contractual duty to arbitrate).
72. 104 S. Ct. at 1514. See, e.g., Boaz Spinning Co. v. NLRB, 395 F.2d 512, 514 (5th
Cir. 1968) (disruptive shouts and insults during employer's speech to the assembled employees); NLRB v. R.C. Can Co., 340 F.2d 433, 436 (5th Cir. 1965) (employee physically
threatened his employer).
73. 104 S. Ct. at 1514. See, e.g., Advance Industries Div. of Overhead Door Corp. v.
NLRB, 540 F.2d 878, 884 (7th Cir. 1976) ("The employees' refusal to leave the premises,
their failure to express their questions to the management representatives present . . . show
a complete lack of respect for their employer's property rights. We do not believe that Congress intended to countenance such actions."); Crown Cent. Petroleum Corp. v. NLRB, 430
F.2d 724, 729 (5th Cir. 1970) ("An employee may not act with impunity even though he is
engaged in protected activity. His rights, derived from Section 7, must be balanced against
the employer's right to maintain order in his business by punishing acts of
insubordination.").
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lies the protected grievance. Properly submitted through the established procedural channels, the grievance represents the employee's claim which finds a contractual basis in his collective-bargaining agreement. 4 In addition, certain types of conduct may
constitute an informal grievance. 5 Section 7 of the Act finds the
grievance "concerted" and hence "protected" when it is for the
"purpose of collective bargaining or other mutual aid or protection. 176 Therefore, there has been no significant disagreement that
the filing of a formal grievance in accordance with the procedures
established in the collective-bargaining agreement is "concerted"
since it is consistent with the purpose of collective bargaining. 77
Likewise, when two or more employees act together in a manner
consistent with the Act to invoke a right for their mutual aid or
protection, the action is found to be "concerted" even if a formal
grievance has not been filed.78 Finally, one employee's representation of his fellows or attempts to induce his coemployees' participation in his legitimate claim is "concerted" due to the pragmatic
recognition that concerted activity must begin somewhere and that
granting the employer the right to terminate all such activity at its
inception would be inconsistent with the purposes of the Act.7 9 In
74.

104 S. Ct. at 1513. See also United Steelworkers of Am. v. Warrior & Gulf Naviga-

tion Co., 363 U.S. 574, 581 (1960) ("the grievance machinery under a collective bargaining
agreement is at the very heart of the system of industrial self-government"); Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 46 (1957) ("Collective bargaining is a continuing process. Among other
things, it involves day to day adjustments in the contract and other working rules, resolution of new problems not covered by existing agreements, and the protection of employee
rights already secured by contract.").
75. 104 S. Ct. at 1514. See also NLRB v. Washington Aluminum Co., 370 U.S. 9, 14
(1962) ("We cannot agree that employees necessarily lose their right to engage in concerted
activities under § 7 merely because they do not present a specific demand upon their employer. . . .The language of § 7 is broad enough to protect concerted activities whether
they take place before, after, or at the same time such a demand is made."); John Sexton &
Co., 217 N.L.R.B. 80, 80 (1975) (refusal of an employee with suspended license to drive his
truck was an assertion of a right contained in the collective-bargaining agreement and hence
constituted a grievance).
76. 29 U.S.C. § 157 (1982).
77. 104 S.Ct. at 1513. See, e.g., NLRB v. Ford Motor Co., 683 F.2d 156, 158 (6th Cir.
1982) (two employees filed a grievance to protest their employer's promotion policies);
NLRB v. Adams Delivery Service, Inc., 623 F.2d 96, 100 (9th Cir. 1980) (employee discharged for consulting with his union representative in an attempt to enforce the overtime
pay provision in his collective-bargaining agreement).
78. 104 S. Ct. at 1511. See, e.g., NLRB v. Washington Aluminum Co., 370 U.S. at 10
(seven of eight nonunion employees walked off job to protest the inadequate heating in their
machine shop on an extraordinarily cold winter day); NLRB v. John Langenbacher Co., 398
F.2d 459, 463 (2d Cir. 1968) (several employees approached the company's president in a
dispute over seniority pay), cert. denied, 393 1049 (1969).
79. 104 S. Ct. at 1511. See, e.g., Mushroom Transp. Co. v. NLRB, 330 F.2d 683, 685
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each of these scenarios the interests of labor and management
come into a relative balance. Furthermore, the result is consistent
with an overall objective of the Act: labor peace.8 0
The Interboro doctrine, as adopted by the Court in City Disposal Systems, operates within a narrow area of the general category
of protected grievances.8 1 It addresses the narrow issue of whether
(3d Cir. 1964) ("It is not questioned that a conversation may constitute a concerted activity
although it involves only a speaker and a listener, but to qualify as such, it must appear at
the very least that it was engaged in with the object of initiating or inducing or preparing
for group action or that it had some relation to group action in the interest of the
employees.").
80. 104 S. Ct. at 1513-14.
81. It must be emphasized that the Interboro doctrine applies only to employees who
are covered by a collective-bargaining agreement. The concerted activity requirement with
respect to employees not covered by collective-bargaining agreements has undergone significant change over the past ten years, the highlights of which may be traced in the following
two cases.
In Alleluia Cushion Co., 221 N.L.R.B. 999 (1975), a maintenance employee became disturbed with various health hazards in his employer's plant. Dissatisfied with his employer's
responses to his numerous complaints, the employee wrote a letter to the local OSHA office
which triggered an OSHA inspection tour of the employer's plant. The employee was subsequently discharged and thus filed an unfair labor practice complaint. Breaking with past
precedent, the Board reversed the ALJ dismissal of the complaint and remanded the case
for further proceedings. Reasoning that the Act must be administered in light of the overall
congressional scheme, the Board ruled that individual activity seeking to invoke a statutory
right would be deemed concerted, even in the absence of any outward manifestation of support from the coemployees, due to the overriding public interest in occupational safety. Id.
at 1000-01.
The Board reversed Alleluia in the recent case of Meyers Indus., Inc., 268 N.L.R.B. No.
73, 115 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 1025 (1984). Considering the case of a truck driver discharged for
refusing to drive an unsafe truck and filing a report with the Tennessee Public Service Commission, the Board returned to what it termed an "objective standard of concerted activity,"
measured by the test of whether the employee's activity was "engaged in with or on the
authority of other employees, and not solely by and on behalf of the employee himself." Id.
at 1029. From its review of the language of section 7 and the legislative history of the Act,
the Board concluded that this result was mandated by the statute and was consistent with
the purposes of the Act, despite the harsh consequences in this case. Id. at 1026, 1031. On
petition for review, the D.C. Circuit remanded the case to the Board to reconsider in light of
the intervening City DisposalSystems decision. Prill v. NLRB, No. 84-1064 (D.C. Cir. Feb.
26, 1985). The court held that the Board's determination that a strict construction of section
7's "concerted activities" language was mandated by the Act was erroneous, given the Supreme Court's more liberal reading of the phrase in City Disposal Systems.
Thus, before the Board again is the issue of whether an individual, not covered by a
collective-bargaining agreement, who invokes a statutory right, is engaged in concerted activity within the meaning of section 7 of the Act. While it may be argued that the individual
non-union employee has greater need of the Act's protections than the individual union
employee, it should be recognized that the more persuasive of the two rationales supporting
the Interboro doctrine-that a legal nexus exists between the individual's attempts to enforce a provision of his collective-bargaining agreement and the concerted activity involved
in the negotiation of the agreement (see supra notes 56-61 and accompanying text)-is not
available to support an extension of section 7's protections to the conduct of individuals not
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an individual employee with a legitimate complaint which has a
basis in his collective-bargaining agreement retains the protection
of section 7 of the Act when he engages in conduct which constitutes, in effect, the expression of an informal grievance. For example, should Brown's refusal to drive truck No. 244 have been
deemed an informal grievance seeking to enforce his contractual
82
right not to operate unsafe equipment?
The practical effect of the Court's adoption of the Interboro doctrine is to provide the individual employee with an additional forum for the resolution of his disputes with his employer.8 3 The
doctrine, which purports to be based on the desire to strengthen
the collective bargaining system, 4 is predicated on the idea that
the individual employee should be able to voice his grievance or
engage in conduct which constitutes the expression of a grievance
without concern for the potential procedural traps of the formal
grievance procedure.8 5 In this case, for example, Brown's refusal to
drive what he believed to be an unsafe truck was considered his
informal grievance.8 6 His presentation of the grievance was "inartful"8 " in that he chose to become involved in a heated argument
with his superiors, he did not refer explicitly to his collective-bargaining agreement, and he stalked off the premises without filing
an immediate grievance form, in accordance with the established
covered by a collective-bargaining agreement. It is not clear, therefore, that the Board is
obligated by the Court's ruling in City Disposal Systems to extend section 7 protection to
individual activity in the non-union setting.
82. 104 S. Ct. at 1511.
83. Id. at 1514 ("an employee's initial statement to an employer to the effect that he
believes a collectively bargained right is being violated, or the employee's initial refusal to
do that which he believes he is not obligated to do, might serve as a natural prelude to, and
an efficient substitute for, the filing of a formal grievance.").
84. Id. at 1513. See also Brief for AFL-CIO as Amicus Curiae in Support of Petitioner,
NLRB v. City Disposal Systems, Inc., 104 S. Ct. 1505 (1984). The AFL-CIO advanced an
argument based on the Bunney Brothers rationale that the individual's activity is an extension of the concerted activity which established the collective-bargaining agreement. The
individual's assertion of his collective right enforces and thereby strengthens the agreement.
Id. at 8-12. See supra notes 56-57.
85. 104 S. Ct. at 1515. The requirements of the informal grievance are satisfied if "the
nature of the employee's complaint is reasonably clear to the person to whom it is communicated and the complaint does, in fact, refer to a reasonably perceived violation of the collective-bargaining agreement." Id. See also Brief for AFL-CIO, supra note 84, at 11, 12. Cf.
Love v. Pullman Co., 404 U.S. 522, 527 (1972) (substantial compliance with EEOC statutory
filing requirements was sufficient since "[sluch technicalities are particularly inappropriate
in a statutory scheme in which laymen, unassisted by trained lawyers, initiate the process.").
86. 104 S. Ct. at 1515.
87. Brief for AFL-CIO, supra note 84, at 11.
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procedure contained in his collective-bargaining agreement.8
Thus, Brown exposed himself to the charge that when he actually
filed his grievance he was protesting a different employer action-his discharge-at a different time.89
City Disposal Systems, then, shifts the burden of making the
grievance system work from the unschooled or inexperienced
worker to his employer. The employee is relieved of the traditional
requirement that he "obey now, grieve later." He may openly voice
complaints, engage in expressive conduct or refuse assignments to
assert a right grounded in the collective-bargaining agreement
without encouraging the participation of his peers or warning them
of a common danger. He need not expressly refer to the collectivebargaining agreement or even be aware of the extent of his contractual rights. The employee is held only to the standards of rea88. The relevant provisions of Article VIII of the collective bargaining agreement
("Arbitration and Grievance Procedure") between City Disposal Systems, Inc. and Local
247 of the International Brotherhood of Teamsters, were as follows:
Section 1. It is mutually agreed that all grievances, disputes or complaints between
the Company and the Union, or any employee or employees, arising under the terms
of this Agreement shall be settled in accordance with the procedures herein provided
and that there shall at no time be any strikes, lock-outs, tie-ups of equipment, slowdowns, walk-outs or any other cessation of work except as specifically agreed to in
other superseding sections of this Contract.
Every effort shall be made to adjust controversies and disagreements in an amicable manner between the Employer and the Union. In the event that any grievance
cannot be settled in this manner, the question may be submitted by either party for
arbitration as hereinafter provided.
Section 2. (a) Should any grievances, disputes or complaints arise, there shall be an
earnest effort on the part of the parties to settle such promptly through the following
steps:
Step 1. By conference between the aggrieved employee, the shop steward, or
both, and the foreman of his department.
Step 1-a. Before proceeding to Step 2 below, it shall be the responsibility of
the aggrieved to reduce any grievance to writing on the regular grievance form
provided by the Local Union.
Step 2. By conference between an official or officials of the Union and the manager, or representative of the company delegated by the manager, or both.
Step. 3. In the event the last step fails to settle the complaint, it shall be referred to the Board of Arbitration upon the request of either party. The President and or Executive Board of the Local Union shall have the right to determine whether or not the grievance is qualified to be submitted for arbitration
by the Union.
A majority decision of the Board of Arbitration shall be rendered without undue delay and shall be final and binding on both parties.
Transcript of Record at 61 (Appendix) (GC Exhibit 2), NLRB v. City Disposal Systems, 104
S. Ct. 1505 (1984).
89. E.g., City Disposal Systems, v. NLRB, 683 F.2d at 1008; Brief for Respondent,
City Disposal Systems, Inc. at 2, 3, NLRB v. City Disposal Systems, 104 S. Ct. 1505 (1984).
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sonableness and honesty 9 0 It is the employer, and his supervisors,
who must be intimately familiar with the collective-bargaining
agreement and the rights it confers on the employees. The employer is placed on constructive notice whenever an employee engages in conduct with a reasonable nexus to the agreement.9 1 Thus,
while poorly articulated complaints or aggressive conduct which
asserts contractual rights may be difficult to distinguish from unprotected insubordination, the employer must be prepared to recognize them as the preliminary stage of the contractual grievance
process, or face the unfair labor practice sanctions of the Act.92
While this extension of the Act's protection of the individual
employee is without express statutory authority or particularly
convincing judicial precedent, it is well established that the appropriate standard for judicial review of Board doctrines is deference
to the Board's reasonable interpretations of the Act which are consistent with federal labor policy. e3 Recognizing the Board's expertise in the labor field, the Court has given the Board the primary
responsibility of adapting the Act to the complex and changing
market place.9' Thus, the Court's adoption of the Interboro doctrine must be examined in light of our national labor policy as it
has evolved into the 1980's.
An examination of the legislative history of the Wagner Act suggests that this degree of extra protection for the individual worker
was not contemplated by the Act's founders. Rather, the Wagner
Act was enacted with the primary objectives of reducing the burdens on interstate commerce created by persistent labor strife and
of improving the pay scales and working conditions of the average
worker to increase his purchasing power, a "demand-side" economic theory for stimulating the depressed economy.' 5 The Act,
90. 104 S. Ct. at 1515. See also John Sexton & Co., 217 N.L.R.B. 80, 80 (1975) ("The
Board has consistently held that Section 7 of the Act protects employees' attempts. . . to
implement the terms of bargaining agreements irrespective of whether the asserted contract
claims are ultimately found meritorious and regardless of whether the employees expressly
refer to applicable contracts in support of their actions or, indeed, are even aware of the
existence of such agreements.").
91. See 104 S. Ct. at 1511-12. See also Petitioner's Reply Brief for Certiorari at 2,
NLRB v. City Disposal Systems, 104 S. Ct. 1505 (1984).
92. 104 S. Ct. at 1513-14.
93. See, e.g., id. at 1510; NLRB v. Transportation Management Corp., 103 S. Ct. 2469,
2475 (1983); NLRB v. Iron Workers, 434 U.S. 335, 350 (1978).
94. E.g., NLRB v. Weingarten, Inc., 420 U.S. 251, 266 (1975); NLRB v. Hearst Publications, Inc., 332 U.S. 111, 130 (1944) ("Everyday experience in the administration of the
statute gives [the Board] familiarity with the circumstances and backgrounds .... ").
95. National Labor Relations Act, § 1 (codifed at 29 U.S.C. § 151 (1982) ("Findings
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therefore, sought to encourage the practice of collective bargaining
as the mechanism by which these dual objectives could be
achieved. The average worker, without bargaining power by himself, was to assume a collective strength when joined with his peers
to reach peaceful and advantageous settlements with his
employer.9 6
From these original purposes of the Act, two dominant themes
have emerged to shape our national labor policy. First, effective
collective bargaining assumes a majority rule. 7 The individual
worker, whose "helplessness as an individual in bargaining with his
employer is recognized,"s surrenders his individual interests and
accepts the exclusive representation of the majority's representative. 99 Since individual contracts tend to weaken the collective barand Policy")). Similar, albeit stronger, language from § 1 ("Declaration of Policy") of the
National Industrial Recovery Act of 1933 is illuminating:
A national emergency productive of widespread unemployment and disorganization
of industry . . . is hereby declared to exist. It is hereby declared to be the policy of
Congress. . .to induce and maintain united action of labor and management. . . to
increase the consumption of industrial and agricultural products by increasing
purchasing power, to reduce and relieve unemployment, to improve standards of labor, and otherwise to rehabilitate industry and to conserve natural resources.
Pub. L. No. 73-67, 48 Stat. 195 (1933). See also S. REP. No. 573, 74th Cong., 1st Sess. (1935),
reprinted in II NLRB, LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS AcT, supra
note 34, at 2302-03. This is not to suggest that the Act was devoid of humanitarian concerns,
but rather to emphasize that it was Depression-era emergency legislation. Other commentators, in fact, have argued that the legislative scheme assigned a much more substantial value
to the rights of the individual employee. See generally Gorman & Finkin, supra note 41, at
338-46; Dolin, The Interboro Doctrine and the Courts: A History of Judicial Pronouncements of the Protected Status of Individual Assertions of Collective Rights, 31 AMER. U.L.
REV. 551, 558-64 (1982). See also Brief for Petitioner, supra note 41, at 17-19. This debate,
however, should not lose sight of the observation that "labor legislation is peculiarly the
product of legislative compromise of strongly held views." NLRB v. Allis-Chalmers Mfg.
Co., 388 U.S. 175, 179 (1975).
96. National Labor Relations Act of 1935, Pub. L. No. 74-198, § 1, 49 Stat. 449 ("Findings and Policy"). See 79 CONG. REc. 2332 (statement of Rep. Boland), reprinted in II
NLRB, LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS AcT, supra note 34, at
2430-31 [excerpt hereinafter cited as Boland]; S. REP. No. 573, supra note 95, at 2300-03.
97. Boland, supra note 96, at 2441. Cf. Emporium Capwell Co. v. Western Addition
Community Org., 420 U.S. 50 (1975) (minority employees who picketed their employer's
department store against their union's advice because they were dissatisfied with the union's
efforts to resolve the dispute through the contract grievance procedure were not entitled to
the Act's protection).
98. Boland, supra note 96, at 2430.
99. In Emporium Capwell Co., 420 U.S. at 62, the Court discussed the concept of
majority rule:
Central to the policy of fostering collective bargaining, where the employees elect that
course, is the principle of majority rule. . . .In establishing a regime of majority rule,
Congress sought to secure to all members of the unit the benefits of their collective
strength and bargaining power, in full awareness that the superior strength of some
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gaining system,1 00 it cannot be expected that each individual will
be satisfied at all times.1 0 ' As Representative Boland pointed out
in the 1935 Congressional debates, this principle of majority rule is
entirely consistent with our democratic institutions.' 2 Second, the
contractual grievance arbitration system is the preferred mechanism by which labor and management reach orderly settlements of
their contractual disputes. 0 3 Collective bargaining agreements are
presumed to be strengthened when all parties have recourse to
prompt and effective enforcement of the agreement. 0 4 Furthermore, the relative time and cost efficient grievance/arbitration system is preferred to a quasi-judicial Board proceeding. 105
While the Interboro doctrine does not gain much support from
the Act's original policies, it is nevertheless clear that the doctrine
individuals or groups might be subordinated to the interest of the majority.
Id. See also NLRB v. Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co., 388 U.S. at 180 ("[National labor policy]
therefore extinguishes the individual employee's power to order his own relations with his
employer and creates a power vested in the chosen representative to act in the interests of
all employees.").
100. Rep. Boland presented the following analysis of the majority rule issue in the
congressional debates:
A literal construction would permit individual bargaining and the making of separate
contracts with various groups. It is the opinion of labor experts that such multiple
bargaining results in chaos and precludes effective collective bargaining. Since the
statute gives employees, as a class, the right to bargain collectively through their representatives, it must be assumed that Congress intended the right to be exercised
effectively.
Boland, supra note 96, at 2441.
101. Ford Motor Co. v. Huffman, 345 U.S. 330, 338 (1953) ("The complete satisfaction
of all who are represented is hardly to be expected.").
102. Boland, supra note 96, at 2442.
103. Section 203(d) of the Act provides in pertinent part: "Final adjustment by a
method agreed upon by the parties is hereby declared to be the desirable method for settlement of grievance disputes arising over the application or interpretation of an existing collective-bargaining agreement." 29 U.S.C. § 173(d) (1982). See also H.R. REP. No. 510, supra
note 39, at 1147 ("Once the parties have made a collective bargaining contract the enforcement of that contract should be left to the usual processes of the law and not to the National Labor Relations Board."); Republic Steel Corp. v. Maddox, 379 U.S. 650, 652 (1965)
("federal labor policy requires that individual employees wishing to assert contract grievances must attempt use of the contract grievance procedure agreed upon by employer and
union as the mode of redress.").
104. 104 S. Ct. at 1513. See, e.g., United Steelworkers of Am. v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574, 581 (1960) ("The processing of disputes through the grievance
machinery is actually a vehicle by which meaning and content are given to the collective
bargaining agreement."); National Labor Relations Act, § 1, 29 U.S.C. § 151 (1982). See
generally S. REP. No. 573, supra note 95, at 2301; Brief for AFL-CIO, supra note 84, at 9,
12.
105. 104 S. Ct. at 1513. See also Hines v. Anchor Motor Freight, Inc., 424 U.S. 554,
562 (1976); Republic Steel Corp. v. Maddox, 379 U.S. at 653; Spielberg Mfg. Co., 112
N.L.R.B. 1080, 1082 (1955). Cf. H.R. REP. No. 510, supra note 39, at 1158.
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must likewise be examined in light of the evolution of the law into
the 1980's. °6 To say that the individual laborer played a relatively
minor role in the labor policy of the Depression era is not conclusive of his role in our current economic, political and social scheme.
In fact, the amendments to the Act in 194717 and 1959,10 s with
their checks on the growing power of the national unions, 0 9 the
express recognition of the individual's right to refrain from joining
a labor organization" 0 and the current development of the wrongful discharge action in some states"' would seem to suggest that
the individual plays a much more substantial role in the current
scheme of our national labor policy than he played in the midst of
the Great Depression when the Act was first passed. The focus
throughout this period of an evolving labor law, however, has been
on the need to balance the often countervailing interests of labor
and management, within the context of the public's interest in labor relations stability and the efficient production of goods and
services.
To measure the individual employee's interest, it is necessary to
determine the significance of the Interboro doctrine's protection
for the individual. Without the Interboro doctrine, the individual
employee relies primarily on the grievance arbitration system to
resolve his disputes related to the collective bargaining agreement." 2 If the individual is not confident of the union's commitment to his problem, he may file his grievance directly with the
employer." 3 If the grievance system breaks down because the
106. See, e.g., NLRB v. Weingarten, Inc., 420 U.S. 251, 266 (1975) ("The Board is
responsible for adapting the Act to the "'changing patterns of industrial life.' ").
107. See supra note 39.
108. See supra note 40.
109. Labor Management Relations Act of 1947, § 1, 29 U.S.C. § 151 (1982) ("Experience has further demonstrated that certain practices by some labor organizations . . . have
the intent or the necessary effect of burdening or obstructing commerce . . . . The elimination of such practices is a necessary condition to the assurance of the rights herein guaranteed."); Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act of 1959, § 2(c), 29 U.S.C. § 401(c)
(1982) ("The Congress, therefore, further finds and declares that the enactment of this
Chapter is necessary to eliminate or prevent improper practices on the part of labor organizations, employers .... ).
110. 29 U.S.C. § 157 (1982). See generally H.R. REP. No. 510, supra note 39, at 1145.
111. See, e.g., Toussaint v. Blue Cross and Blue Shield of Michigan, 408 Mich. 579,
292 N.W.2d 880 (1980) (contract action); Monge v. Beebe Rubber Co., 114 N.H. 130, 316
A.2d 549 (1974) (tort action).
112. See supra note 103.
113. Section 9(a) of the Act provides in pertinent part:
Provided, That any individual employee or a group of employees shall have the right
at any time to present grievances to their employer and to have such grievances ad-
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union has not properly exercised its duty of fair representation, the
employee may bring a contract action against the union and the
employer. 14 With respect to health and safety issues, the individual has additional protection under section 502 of the Act 1 5 and
several other federal safety statutes. 6 Interboro adds to the indijusted, without the intervention of the bargaining representative, as long as the adjustment is not inconsistent with the terms of a collective-bargaining contract or
agreement then in effect: Provided further, That the bargaining representative has
been given opportunity to be present at such adjustment.
29 U.S.C. § 159(a) (1982). See H.R. REP. No. 510, supra note 39, at 1152.
Several commentators have argued that the original proviso to section 9(a), which provided the individual with the right to present his grievances directly to the employer was
indicative of the Wagner Act's concern with the protection of the individual employee, and
hence supports the Interboro doctrine's extension of section 7 protections to the individual.
See Illinois Ruan Transport Corp. v. NLRB, 404 F.2d 274, 286-88 (8th Cir. 1968) (Lay, J.,
dissenting); Dolin, supra note 95, at 560-62. While the Supreme Court was silent as to this
argument, others have rejected it. See ARO, Inc. v. NLRB, 596 F.2d 713, 718-19 (6th Cir.
1979) (§ 9(a) is an exception to the § 7 requirement of concerted activity rather than an
expansion of its scope). Furthermore, section 9(a) anticipates the submission of formal
grievances in accordance with the contractual procedures; it does not authorize the informal
grievance recognized by the Interboro doctrine.
114. Section 301(a) of the Act provides in pertinent part:
Suits for violations of contracts between an employer and a labor organization representing employees . . . may be brought in any district court of the United States
having jurisdiction of the parties, without respect to the amount in controversy or
without regard to the citizenship of the parties.
29 U.S.C. § 185(a) (1982). See, e.g., Hines v. Anchor Motor Freight, Inc., 424 U.S. 554, 567
(1976); Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171, 185-87 (1967).
115. Section 502 of the Act provides in pertinent part: "[N]or shall the quitting of
labor by an employee or employees in good faith because of abnormally dangerous conditions for work at the place of employment of such employee or employees be deemed a
strike under-this Act." 29 U.S.C. § 143 (1982). This provision expressly applies to individual
as well as group activity and, therefore, relieves the employee of the need to meet the "concerted activity" test. In Gateway Coal Co. v. UMWA, 414 U.S. 368 (1974), the Court interpreted this statute as requiring objective evidence of the abnormally dangerous conditions:
"Absent the most explicit statutory command, we are unwilling to conclude that Congress
intended the public policy favoring arbitration and peaceful resolution of labor disputes to
be circumvented by so slender a thread as subjective judgment, however honest it may be."
Id. at 386.
116. Section 660(c)(1) of the Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970, as amended,
provides in pertinent part:
No person shall discharge or in any manner discriminate against any employee because such employee has filed any complaint or instituted or caused to be instituted
any proceeding under or related to this chapter or has testified or is about to testify
in any such proceeding or because of the exercise by such employee on behalf of
himself or others of any right afforded by this chapter.
29 U.S.C. § 660(c)(1) (1982). This statute expressly provides for individual action. See also
Whirlpool Corp. v. Marshall, 445 U.S. 1, 12-13 (1980) (an employee who refuses to perform
an assigned task based on his reasonable apprehension of serious injury and his reasonable
belief that he has no alternative is protected by OSHA).
See also section 405(b) of the Surface Transportation Act of 1982, which provides, in
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vidual employee's portfolio of protections an extra forum for voicing his grievances and a less rigorous standard of conduct in terms
of how those grievances are presented.1 " Given, however, the
Board's established practice of deferring cases to arbitration when
possible," 8 and the availability of the other protections for the individual, the questions of how significant and how necessary these
additional protections are to the individual naturally arise." 9
pertinent part:
No person shall discharge, discipline, or in any manner discriminate against an employee with respect to the employee's compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges
of employment for refusing to operate a vehicle when such operation constitutes a
violation of any Federal Rules, regulations, standards, or orders applicable to commercial motor vehicle safety or health, or because of the employee's reasonable apprehension of serious injury to himself or the public due to the unsafe condition of such
equipment. The unsafe conditions causing the employee's apprehension of injury
must be of such nature that a reasonable person under the circumstances then confronting the employee, would conclude that there is a bona fide danger of an accident,
injury, or serious impairment of health, resulting from the unsafe condition. In order
to qualify for protection under this subsection, the employee must have sought from
his employer, and have been unable to obtain, correction of the unsafe condition.
49 U.S.C. § 2305(b) (1982). This provision, likewise, does not require group action to invoke
its protections.
117. See supra notes 83-92 and accompanying text. In addition, the Interboro doctrine, as adopted by the Court, arguably gives the individual the right to refuse an assignment based on a subjective "honest and reasonable belief." 104 S. Ct. at 1515. Thus, the
doctrine holds the employee to a lower standard of conduct than the other federal safety
statutes and, in this case, the collective-bargaining agreement.
In American Freight System v. NLRB, 722 F.2d 828 (D.C. Cir. 1983), the court rejected
the Board's position that the Interborodoctrine necessitated a two step analysis of the employee's conduct to determine, first, if it had met the contractual objective standard and,
second, if it had met the statutory subjective standard. The court maintained that the contractual waiver doctrine was controlling and that, therefore, the employees waived their
statutory right to an easier subjective standard when they accepted an objective standard in
their collective-bargaining agreement. Id. at 832.
The City Disposal Systems decision is not conclusive on the issue of whether the Interboro doctrine in fact establishes a subjective standard more relaxed than the objective
standard of the collective-bargaining agreement. It appears from the language of Justice
Brennan's majority opinion, however, that the Court accepts the reasoning of American
Freight System and that the standard negotiated in the collective-bargaining agreement
would provide the ultimate test of whether the activity was protected. See 104 S. Ct. at
1515-16.
118. 104 S. Ct. at 1515. See, e.g., American Freight System, Inc. v. NLRB, 722 F.2d at
832-33 (Board abused its discretion when it failed to defer to the decision of the grievance
committee); Collyer Insulated Wire, 192 N.L.R.B. 837 (1971); Spielberg Mfg. Co., 112
N.L.R.B. 1080 (1955). In Spielberg, the Board established the standards to govern when it
would defer to the grievance arbitration process. Thus, the Board will defer to an arbitration decision if the proceedings were fair and regular, if all parties agreed to be bound, and
if the arbitration decision is not clearly violative of the Act. Id. at 1082.
119. As discussed in the amicus brief submitted by the Teamsters for a Democratic
Union, the problem of the truck driver facing a potentially dangerous driving assignment
may require the partial waiver of the group action requirement. This brief pointed out that,
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The employer's interests include the ability to maintain efficient,
uninterrupted production or services. This, of course, requires the
cooperation of each employee. While the Act protects certain types
of employee conduct, it also recognizes the employer's right to discourage the employee's "gripe" or "grab," through discharge if necessary.12 0 The problems, of course, arise when the law attempts to
establish precise definitions distinguishing protected and unprotected conduct.
"Insubordination" is a relative term which naturally depends on
the perspective of the party in question. From the employer's perspective, any employee complaint or conduct which interrupts production or interferes with the business is insubordination.' 2 1 The
Act, however, protects some employee conduct which the employer
would tend to term 'insubordination." The individual employee
in addition to the highly dangerous nature of this profession, the truck driver often discovers the defective condition of his vehicle when he is by himself and far from the home base.
A telephone call to his supervisor may put him in the difficult position of choosing between
"insubordination" and the potential for a serious accident. The argument concluded that
the individual truck driver faced with the possibility of endangering himself and others on
the public highways should be allowed to refuse his assignment based on his reasonable and
honest belief that the vehicle is unsafe. Brief of Teamsters for a Democratic Union as Amicus Curiae in Support of Petitioner at 5-7, NLRB v. City Disposal Systems, 104 S. Ct. 1505
(1984).
In a recent case, presenting a similar fact situation, but without the presence of a collective-bargaining agreement, the Board answered this argument as follows:
Although it might be argued that the solitary over-the-road truckdriver would be
hard pressed to enlist the support of co-workers while away from the home terminal,
the Board . . . is neither God nor the Department of Transportation. Outraged
though we may be by a respondent who-at the expense of its driver and others
traveling on the nation's highways-was clearly attempting to squeeze the last drop
of life out of a trailer that had just as clearly given up the ghost, we are not empowered to correct all immorality or even illegality arising under the total fabric of Federal and state laws.
Meyers Indus., Inc., 268 N.L.R.B. No. 73, 115 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 1025, 1031 (1984). The issue,
then, is not whether the truck driver is entitled to protection from bodily harm, but rather
whether the Board is the proper agency to regulate specialized health and safety hazards in
the workplace.
120. Section 10(c) of the Act provides in pertinent part: "No order of the Board shall
require the reinstatement of any individual as an employee who has been suspended or
discharged . . . if such individual was suspended or discharged for cause." 29 U.S.C. §
160(c) (1982).
121. See generally Brief for the Chamber of Commerce as Amicus Curiae in Support
of Respondent, and Brief of Roadway Express, Inc., as Amicus Curiae in Support of Respondent, NLRB v. City Disposal Systems, 104 S. Ct. 1505 (1984). Both briefs discussed the
issue primarily in terms of "insubordination," and tended to confuse the "concerted" and
"protected" issues, which the Court was careful to distinguish in its analysis. 104 S. Ct. at
1514. Both amicus briefs, however, present strong arguments from the employer's
perspective.
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may have an even more relaxed view of what constitutes insubordination. This conflict of perspectives is a natural outgrowth of the
inherent tension in the employment relationship and should be
recognized in the analysis of the Interboro doctrine.
The Act, which fetters both the employer's and the employee's
conception of their appropriate standard of conduct, should seek
to aid both groups in their attempt to identify the area of protected activity if it is to remain consistent with the critical objective of promoting harmony and cooperation in the employment relationship. Thus, a secondary issue in City Disposal Systems
should have been whether the Interboro doctrine aids or inhibits
the employer and the employee in identifying what each can and
cannot do within the Act's protection. 22
A legal prerequisite that the employee be engaged in or preparing for some form of group action in order to claim the protection
of the Act clearly serves this recognized employer interest in identifying and discouraging the unprotected "gripe" and "grab." The
fundamental value of the in concert requirement is that it imposes
a passage of time between the individual's initial conception of his
idea or complaint and his ability to act under the protection of the
Act. Thus, it serves to inhibit rash action, which may stray toward
unprotected abusiveness or even violence. It allows the employee
time for reflection, even if only momentary, during which he can
focus his complaint and then test its validity as he seeks to induce
the interested action of his coworkers. In many instances, it will
operate to protect the individual from his own ill-considered action. Furthermore, it provides the employer, caught between the
duty to comply with the labor laws and the need to maintain an
efficient production schedule, with an objective test for evaluating
the validity of employee complaints and conduct which appear to
be insubordination, but may, in fact, be protected by the Act. 23
122. Since the issue of whether Brown's conduct was protected was not before the
Court, Justice Brennan did not establish useful guidelines for determining the boundaries of
protected activity. See supra notes 68 & 73.
123. See Brief of Amicus Curiae, The Legal Foundation of America, Urging Affirmance, NLRB v. City Disposal Systems, 104 S. Ct. 1505 (1984). This Brief identifies nine
policy reasons for retaining the "in concert" requirement's pre-Interboro doctrine meaning.
They may be summarized as follows: the "in concert" requirement (1) increases probability
that matters of general concern will be advanced; (2) increases probability that valid complaints will be advanced; (3) focuses the issue; (4) fosters labor peace; (5) prevents unruly
employees from taking advantage of their coemployees; (6) helps employers to deal with
individuals with poor work habits; (7) increases the employer's willingness to bargain collectively; (8) favors the inexpensive grievance process; (9) maintains a clear definition of Board
jurisdiction. See id.
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The public shares the employee's interest in acceptable working
conditions and fair treatment and the employer's interest in efficient production. Furthermore, the public has an especially keen
interest in the peaceful compromise of potentially conflicting interests. As the dissenting opinion of Justice O'Connor pointed out,
however, the public interest may be implicated in another, more
important way which transcends the parochial concerns of the labor law field. At issue, Justice O'Connor claimed, was a fundamental question of the appropriate scope of authority of an administrative agency operating in an area where its authority has not been
expressly granted by Congress. 2 "
By extending its jurisdiction over the conduct of individual employees, the Board has enabled such individuals to make unfair labor practices out of their contract disputes.115 Congress, however,
has expressly indicated that contract disputes are to be resolved by
the grievance/arbitration process, with ultimate recourse to the
courts, rather than by the Board.' 2 6 When the Board asserts jurisdiction to resolve the dispute it necessarily interprets the collective-bargaining agreement. 2 " In the instant case, for example, the
Board determined that the established grievance procedures were
too complicated for the individual employee to understand and implement. 2 8 That the Board, a quasi-judicial administrative agency,
has acquired for itself this undelegated power is a matter of general concern regarding the appropriate extent of governmental regulation of business.
City Disposal Systems has extended section 7's protections to
the individual employee who asserts a right contained in his collective-bargaining agreement. The Court's adoption of the Board's
Interboro doctrine, however, imposes a number of costs on the labor/management employment relationship which the Board should
assess as it determines the scope of the City Disposal Systems rule
in future decisions. While it has arguably aided the individual
union employee by its ruling, the Court has increased governmental regulation of private labor contracts and aggravated the employers' attempts at compliance. Perhaps most important, how124. 104 S. Ct. at 1517 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
125. Id.
126. H.R. REP. No. 510, supra note 39, at 1147. See NLRB v. C & C Plywood Corp.,
385 U.S. 421, 427-28 (1967); Charles Dowd Box Co. v. Courtney, 368 U.S. 502, 513 (1962).
127. 104 S. Ct. at 1517 (O'Connor, J., dissenting). See also NLRB v. C & C Plywood
Corp., 385 U.S. at 428.
128. 104 S. Ct. at 1515.
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ever, is the weakening effect this decision has on the Act's
fundamental goals of encouraging employees to work together for
their common benefit and of encouraging employers to meet with
the employee groups to fashion a common understanding. If the
Act is to be an effective tool for aiding the re-emergence of a dynamic economy characterized by efficiency and fairness in labor relations, the interpretation of each section of the Act should strive
for an optimum balance of the varied management, labor and public interests. The Court has missed this opportunity in City Disposal Systems.
Francis X. Matt, III

